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Baumol and Bowen (1966), in their groundbreaking book Performing Arts
– The Economic Dilemma, painted a dismal future for the performing arts
in general and symphony orchestras in particular. In their view, costs of
staging performances would increase at a faster rate than would their
earned income because opportunities for cost reductions are limited. Con-
tributions would not likely increase at a rate sufficient to cover this growing
‘income gap’; hence the presence of a ‘cost disease’ affecting organizations
in the performing arts. Consequently, private and government subsidies are
inevitable if orchestras are to continue to operate as in the past. The
authors noted that subsidies to the arts could be justified: ‘If one agrees that
the performing arts confer general benefits on the community as a whole
. . . the arts are public goods whose benefits demonstrably exceed the
receipts one can hope to collect at the box office’ (ibid., pp.385–6).
Hansmann (1981) disagrees, arguing that organizations in the perform-
ing arts are not-for-profit because they face high fixed costs and a relatively
small demand. Moreover, their fixed costs have risen faster than their vari-
able costs and revenues. They must therefore rely on a system of price dis-
crimination if they are to cover their costs, because there is no one price that
will exceed their average total cost. Consequently, a system of price dis-
crimination has developed whereby the price is set in the inelastic range of
demand with the expectation that patrons will voluntarily make a tax-
deductible donation to the organization.
Cost disease: empirical tests and evidence
Although their argument for the inevitability of the income gap appeared
persuasive, Baumol and Bowen underestimated the ability of non-profit
performing arts organizations to adjust. Throsby (1994) cited studies exam-
ining whether organizations in the performing arts experienced what has
come to be known as Baumol’s ‘cost disease’ and found that ‘the combined
impacts of production adjustments, increased demand, and generally rising
levels of unearned revenue have countered any tendency towards a secular
rise in deficits among performance companies, suggesting that although the
cost disease will doubtless continue to present the performing arts with
difficult problems, it is unlikely to be terminal’ (ibid., p.16).
Felton (1994–5) addressed the issue of whether symphony orchestras
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suffered the ‘cost disease’ and found that, because of productivity lags,
orchestras have temporarily suffered budget deficits. By increasing the
number of ensemble performances, touring more frequently and offering
summer concerts, for example, the orchestras have been able to overcome
this problem. Volpe (1991) constructed a growth model to test whether the
composition of orchestra output affected the ‘income gap’. Using data
from the American Symphony Orchestras League’s (ASOL’s) comparative
reports and controlling for demographic variables, he found that the
income gap was decreasing for all orchestras in his sample, which included
orchestras in all of ASOL’s budget classification. Volpe also found that the
deficit for all but the smaller market orchestras was sensitive to the mix of
concerts offered, and concluded that there is strong evidence that orches-
tras to some extent can exert control over their deficits. Arthur Brooks
(2000) argued that opportunities to overcome any income gap facing
orchestras differ according to their relative size. Drawing on empirical
research, he concluded that larger orchestras should diversify product lines,
use technological innovations and expand audiences through education
programmes, whereas smaller orchestras would be served by expanding
their philanthropic base.
Economies of scale and scope
Sources of productivity increases can result from scale economies as
research by Baumol and Bowen (1996), Globerman and Book (1974) and
Lange et al. (1985) have shown. The latter study found that the number of
concerts required to achieve minimum average cost were significantly fewer
than shown by the other studies and that, while orchestras performing
fewer concerts have higher average costs, they may have been at minimum
costs given their market size.
Symphony orchestras offer a variety of concerts: regular concerts,
summer concerts, concerts on tour, ensemble concerts, and other offerings,
such as youth and other concerts. Studies that use concerts or attendance
as output measures result in an amalgamation variable, which is not homo-
geneous. The mix of ‘outputs’ offered by symphony orchestras reveals them
to be multi-product non-profit enterprises; consequently, cost studies
focusing on economies of scale are misdirected.
Lange and Luksetich (1993) noted that focusing on scale economies
directs attention on whether services provided by firms in markets where
demand is limited are more expensive. The question therefore arises,
‘Should they be combined with other firms producing similar services,
resulting in specialization and greater efficiency?. The authors argued that,
in multi-product firms, the concern also is the interaction between the cost
of one service and the amount of other services provided; that is, whether
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economies of scope exist in the provision of the multitude of services
offered. This study, ‘The Cost of Producing Symphony Orchestra Services’,
revealed that scale economies were not a usual source of efficiency for sym-
phony orchestras. On the other hand, orchestras serving major markets
benefit from scope economies to a far greater extent than those serving
smaller markets. Consequently, policies encouraging the diversification of
services of the larger orchestras and encouraging the specialization of ser-
vices offered by smaller orchestras would be efficient, if the only concern
was costs. Moreover, as Felton (1994–5) noted, the increased diversification
of services offered by major orchestras has been a source of increased effi-
ciency, while Volpe (1991) showed that it also results in greater revenues.
Pricing of orchestra services
Hansmann (1981) noted that firms in the performing arts face significantly
high fixed costs relative to their marginal costs. Consequently, there may
be no one price that covers average total costs. Ticket revenues can be
increased by price discrimination. Because of the difficulty of identifying
demand elasticities of individual patrons or groups of patrons, orchestras
may set ticket prices below the revenue-maximizing price in an effort to
induce patrons to make a voluntary tax-deductible contribution to the
orchestras – a system of voluntary price discrimination.
Attempts to find evidence that symphony orchestras rely on price dis-
crimination to enhance their revenues have taken two routes. One route has
been to determine whether orchestras set their price in the inelastic range
of demand. Those taking this approach conjectured that if they do so,
orchestras are attempting to induce patrons to make a voluntary tax-
deductible contribution to the orchestra. In their initial tests of this hypoth-
esis, Lange and Luksetich (1984) estimated price and other demand
elasticities for three sets of symphony orchestras as classified by the ASOL
as major, metropolitan and urban/regional, based on their budget size.
Using data from the ASOL comparative reports, the authors found that
the 30 orchestras classified as major orchestras on average charged prices
well below revenue-maximizing prices, that is, in the inelastic range of their
demand curve. Prices charged by the other groups of orchestras tended to
be in the elastic range of demand. From this and other evidence, it was
argued that the price-inelastic demand facing major orchestras was not due
to the lack of substitutes but was a deliberate strategy to induce patrons to
donate.
Felton (1992) also found that larger orchestras tended to price in the
inelastic range of demand and that smaller orchestras had higher price elas-
ticities. She estimated the price elasticity of demand facing individual
orchestras and found a wide range of price elasticities of demand, which
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largely reflected differences in market characteristics and pricing strategies
of the individual orchestras. In a second paper (1994–5), Felton’s estimates
show price elasticities of demand much closer to those reported by Lange
and Luksetich (1984) and that orchestras could increase revenues signifi-
cantly from ticket sales by increasing ticket prices. She did not speculate on
whether this strategy would affect donations.
Two studies took a second route and attempted to test directly whether
symphony orchestras practise price discrimination to increase donations.
Seaman (1987) examined whether firms in the non-profit arts sector offered
a greater number of price selections for their performance than those in the
for-profit arts sector. He found that non-profit arts firms, including sym-
phony orchestras, charged a greater variety of prices than for-profit arts
organizations and that, in the non-profit arts sector, only operatic organ-
izations discriminated in price more than symphony orchestras.
In an effort to tie the number of price categories to donations, Seaman
examined whether the number of price categories was correlated to the
number of donor categories (each category presumably offered different
amenities to donors). Very few of the symphony orchestras tied the pur-
chase of subscription tickets to a particular donor category. He did find
that price discrimination is more prevalent among those art forms, specifi-
cally opera and symphony orchestras, which have higher fixed costs. More-
over, high fixed cost organizations exhibit a greater correlation between the
number of prices charged and the number of donation categories. Seaman
concluded that the evidence he presented was largely consistent with
Hansmann’s argument concerning price discrimination in the arts.
In their paper, ‘A Simultaneous Model of Symphony Orchestra Behavior’,
Lange and Luksetich (1995) used time-series data from ASOL’s Comparative
Reports to examine the behaviour of symphony orchestras. They tested
whether prices charged by the various classes of symphony orchestras were in
the inelastic range of demand and whether this resulted in increased gifts
from private individuals. For the major orchestras, on average, lower than
revenue-maximizing prices increase donations. However, revenue losses, from
the lower prices were not completely offset by the gain in donations: the price
was set too low. There was no relationship between price charged and dona-
tions for metropolitan orchestras. For orchestras classified as urban/regional
(orchestras serving smaller markets), lower prices resulted in lower revenues
from donations. It was speculated that, for these orchestras, ticket price was
a signal of quality, and higher prices would result in an increased willingness
to donate. The results indicated that, on average, all orchestras in all size clas-
sifications could increase their net revenues by increasing ticket prices and
only the largest would suffer any decrease in revenues from donations.
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Goals and fundraising
Economic theory assumes that individuals are maximizers and private for-
profit business firms are profit maximizers. Since non-profits cannot dis-
tribute any surplus over costs to the owners or organizers of the institution,
it is generally assumed that they are likely to maximize their output, quality,
budget or some combination of these goals. Hansmann argued that the
goals of non-profit firms in the arts could be ascertained by examining how
they spend funds they receive that do not require specific services to be per-
formed (lump-sum grants in his parlance).
Lange et al. (1986) presented results showing that major orchestras spent
unrestricted funds in a manner consistent with quality-maximization goals.
Although these funds were used to increase administrative expenses, the
increased administrative expenses were in turn positively related to quality-
enhancing expenditures (as measured by artistic, production, promotion
and other expenses per concert). It appeared that budget maximizing and
quality maximizing were complementary goals in the case of the major
orchestras. Estimates showed that both the metropolitan and the smaller
market orchestras had output maximization as their major goal. In both
cases, the unconditional grants received by orchestras were positively related
to the number of concerts, which in turn resulted in greater attendance.
Studies concerned with the fundraising activities of symphony orches-
tras generally conclude that they do not follow Steinberg’s (1986) admoni-
tion that they spend up to the point where the marginal benefits from
fundraising expenditures equal their marginal costs (for example, see Lange
et al., 1987). An examination of the efficiency of symphony orchestra fund-
raising efforts using Data Envelopment Analysis showed significant ineffi-
ciencies in fundraising efforts. Moreover, it showed that orchestras could
learn much about fundraising by examining how orchestras in their ‘peer
group’ conducted their fundraising efforts. See Luksetich and Hughes
(1997).
Brooks (1999) investigated whether government grants to symphony
orchestras ‘crowded out’ private giving or whether they enhanced private
donations. The latter would occur if private donors believed that National
Endowment for the Arts grants provided a stamp of excellence on the
grantee. His results showed that government grants and private donations
were independent of each other. Lange and Luksetich found that, for major
orchestras, grants from governments requiring services enhanced private
donations, while unconditional grants appeared to replace private giving.
They presumed that the former types of grants had a matching provision.
Their estimates indicated that both types of grants offset private giving for
metropolitan orchestras and that conditional grants crowded out private
giving to the small market orchestras.
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Concluding comments
There has developed a substantial body of literature on the economics of
symphony orchestras since the mid-1960s. This chapter has tried to high-
light research touching on the major economic issues facing symphony
orchestras. Space limitations prevent a comprehensive discussion of what
is contained in that research. Readers are encouraged to peruse the research
discussed above to better understand the economics of symphony orches-
tras in particular and the performing arts in general.
See also:
Chapter 11: Baumol’s cost disease; Chapter 17: Costs of production; Chapter 43: Non-profit
organizations; Chapter 57: Tax concessions.
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